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Do High Cohort Default Rates Affect Student Living Allowances and 
Debt Burdens? An Empirical Analysis 




The federal government holds colleges accountable for their students’ cohort default rates (CDRs), 
with colleges facing the potential loss of all federal financial aid dollars if their CDRs are too high 
for three consecutive years. Yet a sizable portion of student borrowing is for non-tuition living 
expenses—funds that the college does not get to keep. In this paper, I examine whether colleges at 
risk of federal sanctions due to high CDRs respond by reducing living allowances in an effort to 
limit borrowing and if student debt burdens decrease after a college receives a high default rate. 
Using data from public two-year and for-profit colleges for students who entered repayment 
between 1998 and 2011 matched with living allowances and student debt levels from subsequent 
years, I find no evidence that colleges are engaging in these types of strategic behaviors in an effort 












he approximately $140 billion in federal financial aid dollars that flow to colleges and universities 
each year (Baum, Ma, Pender, & Libassi, 2018) represent a significant portion of many colleges’ 
operating budgets. As a result, institutions of higher education have a strong incentive to respond to 
any threats to this important source of revenue. Under Title IV of the Higher Education Act, colleges can 
lose access to federal financial aid for failing to meet all of the conditions set forth in the program 
participation agreements they sign with the U.S. Department of Education. In addition to complying with 
anti-discrimination provisions and agreements to share data with the U.S. Department of Education, 
colleges must meet a number of basic quality metrics. Some of these include being accredited by a 
recognized agency, having sufficient oversight and governance practices, and being financially stable 
(Federal Student Aid, 2017).  
 
One additional requirement that a number of colleges struggle to satisfy on a regular basis is the cohort 
default rate (CDR) metric, which subjects colleges to sanctions up to and including the loss of all federal 
financial aid eligibility (including Pell Grants) if the percentage of borrowers defaulting on their loans within 
a given period of time exceeds a given threshold. In 2018, seven colleges faced the loss of all federal grant 
and loan aid for having three-year default rates over 30% for three consecutive years, while an additional 
five colleges were also subject to the loss of federal loan eligibility for having the most recent cohort default 
at a rate over 40% (Federal Student Aid, 2018b).  
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Although very few colleges actually face the loss of federal financial aid due to high default rates, a 
substantial proportion of federal student aid funds flows through colleges with default rates close to the 
threshold for potential sanctions. Between the 2007-08 and 2013-14 academic years, the percentage of 
federal student loans disbursed to students attending colleges with default rates over 15% rose from 11% to 
22%, while the percentage of all federal grants flowing through these colleges rose from 24% to 44% 
(Jaquette & Hillman, 2015). These rates are even higher at community colleges and for-profit institutions 
(the focus of this paper), where a majority of both grant and loan dollars go to colleges with default rates 
over 15%. This places some institutions at risk of additional oversight or potentially even losing funds if 
economic conditions limit students’ ability to repay loans. This also has implications for students, as a 
majority of students now rely on federal financial aid to help make college more affordable (Baum et al., 
2018). 
 
Colleges currently have a limited set of options to help avoid losing access to all federal financial aid 
dollars. The most extreme option is to opt out of offering federal student loans in an effort to preserve 
access to Pell Grants and other non-loan types of federal financial aid, and two types of colleges are more 
likely to do so. The majority of colleges opting out are community colleges, many of which have higher 
percentages of minority students relative to other community colleges (Cochrane & Szabo-Kubitz, 2016), 
while a number of small, relatively inexpensive for-profit colleges have opted out of the federal student loan 
program (Hillman & Jaquette, 2014). This option comes with risks to the college, as research by Wiederspan 
(2016) has shown that students who attend community colleges that have opted out of the federal loan 
program have poorer outcomes than similar students at other colleges who can access loans. 
 
Many colleges have chosen to implement a comprehensive default management strategy, which often 
involves the use of outside firms to follow up with students who may be at risk of default (e.g., Blumenstyk, 
2010). This can include encouraging students to enroll in income-driven repayment plans, which now cover 
nearly 40% of all new federal student loan dollars (author’s calculations using Federal Student Aid data). Yet 
it can also result in colleges pushing students into deferment and forbearance programs until the measured 
default rate window passes, and there is evidence that a number of for-profit colleges used this practice to 
manage default rates even as it resulted in students’ loan balances rising (United States Senate Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 2012). 
 
One option that many colleges would like to pursue is to reduce what they consider ‘overborrowing’ for 
college—students who take on more debt than may be necessary for their program of study or may be 
beyond their ability to repay. Reducing debt has become an important policy concern due to the relationship 
between debt burdens and default rates after controlling for other factors such as whether the student 
graduated (e.g., Gross, Cekic, Hossler, & Hillman, 2009; Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 2015), even as some 
researchers have expressed concerns about some students borrowing too little for college rather than too 
much (Boatman, Evans, & Soliz, 2017; Goldrick-Rab & Kelchen, 2015; Marx & Turner, 2019). But current 
federal law does not give colleges the ability to summarily restrict loan offers to what they deem necessary, 
with the exception of an experimental sites initiative that allowed 28 colleges to reduce annual loan limits for 
groups of students by $2,000 per year (Federal Student Aid, 2015). However, the House of Representatives’ 
2017 version of Higher Education Act reauthorization proposed to allow colleges to set lower borrowing 
limits at the program level (NASFAA Policy & Federal Relations Staff, 2017).  
 
Federal regulations limit the amount of financial aid that a student can receive to the total cost of 
attendance (COA), which includes tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, and a category of 
miscellaneous expenses such as transportation, personal care, and child care (Federal Student Aid, 2017). 
Many students have enough room remaining in their financial aid package after grants and work-study funds 
to accept the maximum amount of federal student loans, which is between $5,500 and $12,500 for 
undergraduates based on the student’s year in school and dependency status. But students attending less-
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expensive colleges or attending part-time may not be able to take out the maximum amount of loans 
without hitting the cost of attendance limit for financial aid, meaning that colleges could potentially reduce 
student borrowing by lowering the cost of attendance. In the 2011-12 academic year, more than 75% of 
financially independent students at community colleges and 25% of similar students at for-profit colleges 
did not have enough room in their aid package to take out the maximum in federal loans (author’s 
calculation using data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study). 
 
Colleges have a great deal of leeway in how they determine the cost of attendance, as long as they fall 
within broad federal guidelines (NASFAA, 2014). If a college is trying to reduce the amount that its students 
borrow, it can reduce the COA in two ways. The first way is to lower tuition and fees or room and board 
charges for on-campus students, which reduces the amount of revenue that the college receives. The second 
way, which does not directly affect a college’s budget, is to reduce indirect expenses in the cost of 
attendance such as estimated living expenses for off-campus students and an estimated transportation 
allowance for all students.  
 
The flexibility in determining living allowances means that colleges that are concerned about default rates 
or student borrowing levels in general may seek to set lower living allowances for off-campus students in an 
effort to limit borrowing. This can take two forms: increasing allowances by a smaller amount than they 
otherwise would have or reducing the prior year’s allowance. In this paper, I explore whether for-profit and 
community colleges (the institutions that are most likely to have high cohort default rates) are engaging in 
these types of practices. My research questions are the following: 
 
(1) Do colleges that are just above the threshold of facing sanctions for high cohort default rates have 
smaller increases in living allowances for off-campus students than colleges that are just below the 
threshold? 
(2) Are colleges just above the threshold of facing sanctions more likely to reduce their off-campus living 
allowances than colleges just below the threshold? 
(3) Do graduates and dropouts of colleges just above the threshold of facing sanctions have different 
amounts of student debt than graduates and dropouts of colleges just below the threshold? 
 
An Overview of Cohort Default Rates 
  
Cohort default rates represent one of the primary metrics that the U.S. Department of Education uses to 
hold colleges accountable for their performance (see Kelchen (2018) for a full list of federal accountability 
policies in higher education). A former student of a college is considered to have defaulted if he or she does 
not make a payment on their federal loans for a 360-day period (Federal Student Aid, 2018a). CDRs are 
based on federal subsidized and unsubsidized loans, excluding parent and graduate student PLUS loans and 
Perkins loans. Colleges were evaluated using a two-year CDR for accountability purposes through the 
release of the outcomes for the cohort of students entering repayment in Fiscal Year 2011 in 2013 (the 
period of time for this study). Currently, colleges are evaluated using a three-year CDR, with the time period 
being expanded in an effort to capture a longer period of post-college outcomes.  
 
Colleges with a CDR over a certain percentage (25% using the two-year CDR and 30% using the three-
year CDR) in a given year must adopt a comprehensive default management plan that must be reviewed by 
the U.S. Department of Education, and a default rate of over 40% in one year results in the potential loss of 
federal student loans. Three consecutive default rates over 25% (two-year CDR) or 30% (three-year CDR) 
result in the potential loss of federal grant and loan eligibility for a period of three years. Table 1 below 
shows trends in two-year cohort default rates by institutional sector and year. Two-year CDRs peaked at 
22.4% for the cohort entering repayment in 1990 before steadily falling to under six percent by 1999. 
Kelchen: Do High Cohort Default Rates Affect Student Living Allowances and Debt Burdens? An Empirical Analysis 
 
4                Journal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education at the University of Louisville  Vol. 49, N1, 2019 
Default rates then remained around five percent in the early and mid-2000s before rising to 10% in 2011, 













1987 17.6     
1988 17.2     
1989 21.4     
1990 22.4     
1991 17.8     
1992 15.0     
1993 11.6     
1994 10.7 13.8 6.8 6.9 21.1 
1995 10.4 14.2 7.1 7.4 19.9 
1996 9.6 13.3 7.0 7.0 18.2 
1997 8.8 12.7 6.9 6.1 15.4 
1998 6.9 10.7 5.7 4.7 11.4 
1999 5.6 8.8 4.6 3.8 9.3 
2000 5.9 9.3 4.8 4.0 9.4 
2001 5.4 8.7 4.4 3.5 9.0 
2002 5.2 8.5 4.0 3.2 8.7 
2003 4.5 7.6 3.3 2.8 7.3 
2004 5.1 8.1 3.5 3.0 8.6 
2005 4.6 7.9 3.0 2.4 8.2 
2006 5.2 8.5 3.4 2.5 9.7 
2007 6.7 9.9 4.3 3.7 11.0 
2008 7.0 10.1 4.4 4.0 11.6 
2009 8.8 11.9 5.2 4.6 15.0 
2010 9.1 13.4 6.0 5.2 12.9 
2011 10.0 15.0 6.8 5.2 13.6 
SOURCE: Office of Federal Student Aid, U.S. Department of 
Education. 
NOTES:      
(1) The cohort entering repayment in 2011 was the last year 
for which two-year CDRs were calculated. 
(2) Public two-year colleges include colleges offering 
credentials of less than two years in length due to a lack of 
data availability. 
(3) Data by institutional sector are unavailable 
prior to 1994.  
 
 




Journal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education at the University of Louisville  Vol. 49, N1, 2019                5 
There is substantial variation in the typical default rate by institutional sector and type. For the 2011 
cohort, community colleges had the highest two-year CDRs (15%), although only about 37% of community 
college students take out federal loans (author’s calculation using data from the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Study). For-profit colleges had slightly lower default rates than community colleges, with a 
13.6% CDR for the 2011 cohort; however, for-profit students make up 44% of all loan defaults due to their 
high borrowing rate (Turner, 2015). Both four-year public and four-year private nonprofit colleges had 
CDRs well below 10%, reflecting the greater level of financial resources possessed by their student bodies 
and the larger average returns to attending a four-year college versus a two-year college or a for-profit 
institution (e.g., Hout, 2012). 
 
Prior research has shown that both student-level factors such as race, gender, and family income and 
institutional-level factors such as level and sector are associated with default rates and eventual student loan 
repayment rates (Gross et al., 2009; Hillman, 2014; Ishitani & McKitrick, 2016; Kelchen & Li, 2017; Webber 
& Rogers, 2014). Of particular relevance to this study is research by Hillman (2015), who examined trial 
(pre-accountability) three-year CDRs from the cohort of students leaving college in 2008. He showed that 
for-profit colleges, minority-serving institutions, and colleges serving large percentages of black and low-
income students are more likely to have CDRs above the 30% cutoff that would subject institutions to 
additional federal oversight or sanctions. 
 
There is also some evidence that students respond to the possibility that a college might lose its eligibility 
for federal student financial aid due to high CDRs. Darolia (2013) analyzed for-profit colleges close to the 
25% two-year default rate cutoff for facing sanctions using data from 1990 to 2000. He found that colleges 
just above the threshold have fall enrollment levels about 17% to 18% lower than colleges just below the 
sanctioning threshold, with the enrollment decline driven by fewer new students rather than an increase in 
the number of students transferring away from the college.  
 
Data, Sample, and Methods 
 
To examine whether there is a relationship between colleges facing pressures to reduce federal cohort 
default rates and any reductions of cost of attendance components or overall student debt burdens, I used a 
14-year panel dataset consisting of students who entered repayment in Fiscal Years 1998 through 2011. In 




I used two-year cohort default rates for the cohorts of students entering repayment in Fiscal Year 1998 
through Fiscal Year 2011, the final cohort for which two-year CDRs were calculated. I did not use data 
from newer cohorts on three-year CDRs, where the threshold moved from 25% to 30%. Although draft 
three-year CDRs were calculated for the 2009-2011 cohorts, they were not used for accountability purposes 
and thus these cohorts can be used in my analyses. These data, from the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office of Federal Student Aid and compiled through the College Scorecard, reflect the percentage of 
borrowers who defaulted within two fiscal years after entering repayment. During this period, a 25% default 
rate in any given year required colleges to develop a default management plan and submit it to the U.S. 
Department of Education for review, while three consecutive CDRs above 25% resulted in the potential 
loss of federal financial aid dollars. While relatively few colleges lost access to federal funds, a larger number 
of colleges crossed the 25% threshold in at least one year. Colleges with a CDR over 40% in any year could 
lose access to federal student loan dollars, but there were not enough institutions with these default rates 
during the length of the panel to conduct any analyses. 
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The default rate data were matched with data on cost of attendance (COA) components from IPEDS 
from the academic year following the initial release of CDRs to colleges, meaning that data from the 2000-
01 through 2013-14 academic years were used to match up with the FY 1998-FY 2011 repayment cohorts. 
For example, I used the 2011-12 COA components to match up with the cohort of students entering 
repayment in FY2009 and tracked through the end of FY2010 (September 30, 2010), as colleges received 
the draft default rates in early 2011 and had several months to adjust their pricing before the start of the 
following academic year. As robustness checks, I also used two-year and three-year lags to account for the 
possibility of delayed responses (using the 2012-13 and 2013-14 COA components for the 2009 repayment 
cohort).  
 
The COA components of interest included tuition and fees, room and board (for students living away 
from home only, as colleges do not have to report a room and board allowance to the federal government 
for students living at home with their family), and a miscellaneous expense category including 
transportation, laundry, and entertainment. I focused on changes in the posted allowances for full-time 
students living off-campus with their family (living ‘at home’) and those living off-campus without their 
family, excluding COAs for students living on-campus because few for-profit and community colleges have 
on-campus housing. I excluded the books and supplies category with the COA because colleges appear to 
adjust the allowance infrequently and because colleges may differ in what percentage of revenue they receive 
from the textbook allowance. 
 
I used two different measures to examine whether colleges changed cost of attendance components in 
response to default rate pressures. First, I used the logged value of each of the COA components, adjusted 
for inflation using the Consumer Price Index.  This explores whether colleges with a default rate subject to 
sanctions increased their allowances at lower rates than colleges not subject to sanctions. Second, I 
considered an indicator of whether a college decreased the living allowance (in nominal dollars) by at least 
$1 from the previous. The action of cutting living allowances in a period in which the cost of living was 
generally increasing is a likely indicator of a college trying to reduce student budgets. As a robustness check, 
I also used a $100 decline as the threshold; the results were generally similar and are not presented here for 
the sake of brevity. 
 
Colleges reported COA data in two different ways. Nearly all bachelor’s degree-granting for-profit 
colleges and community colleges granting associate degrees reported COA components for the length of an 
academic year—typically nine months. However, the majority of for-profit colleges and vocationally-
oriented public community and technical colleges reported COA components for the length of the largest 
program offered. The majority of the programs lasted between 9 and 18 months, and I excluded any 
colleges with programs shorter than six months or larger than 48 months due to likely data reporting issues. 
For the purposes of consistency, I also excluded data from colleges if the largest program (as evidenced by 
its two-digit CIP code) changed from the code reported in 2013-14 before normalizing all program reporter 
data to a nine-month length to compare alongside academic year reporters. Prior to 2006, the length of a 
program was only measured in hours, while it was measured in both hours and years between 2006 and 
2012. I estimated the length in months in prior years by taking the ratio of hours per month in 2006 and 
applying that to earlier data if the length of the program (in hours) was within 20% of the 2006 length. 
 
I also used data on student debt from the College Scorecard to explore whether colleges with high default 
rates were successful in reducing students’ debt burdens. The College Scorecard dataset includes two 
measures of interest for student debt: median debt amounts for graduates who borrowed and median debt 
amounts for dropouts who borrowed. I use debt from the year following the cost of attendance metrics (so 
pairing 2012-13 debt data with cost of attendance data from 2011-12), as most of these colleges offer 
programs of just one or two years in length. Debt amounts were also adjusted for inflation using the 
Consumer Price Index. 
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Sample 
 
Beginning with all colleges that participated in the federal Title IV student loan programs, received a cohort 
default rate, and reported a cost of attendance for off-campus students at least once during the period of my 
study (default rates for the 1998-2011 cohorts of students matched with cost of attendance and student debt 
components from 2000-01 through 2013-14), I excluded all four-year public institutions and all private 
nonprofit colleges because so few of these institutions ever reached the 25% threshold for potential 
sanctions. Just one of the 7,756 observations for four-year public colleges and 82 of 16,568 observations for 
private nonprofits had CDRs above 25%. High default rates were far more common at public 2-year and 
certificate-granting colleges as well as in the for-profit sector, so these two groups of institutions were the 
focus of this analysis.  
 
My analytic sample consisted of 4,810 colleges and universities, including 1,349 public institutions that 
primarily granted associate degrees or certificates and 3,471 for-profit colleges. The summary statistics for 




Summary statistics of the dataset (2013-14, unless noted).      
  All colleges   For-profits   Publics 
Characteristic Mean (SE)   Mean (SE)   Mean (SE) 
Level of institution (pct)         
  Four-year 13.3 (3.1)  18.5 (4.0)  -- -- 
  Two-year 46.5 (1.9)  32.7 (1.9)  81.0 (1.2) 
  Certificate-granting 40.2 (2.1)  48.7 (3.2)  19.0 (1.2) 
Total FTE enrollment (2013-14) 1,452  (73)  527 (46)  3,649 (143) 
Cohort default rate (2011 cohort, 
pct) 13.0 (0.2)  12.7 (0.2)  13.7 (0.2) 
CDR for 2011 cohort over 25% 
(pct) 3.6 (0.4)  3.8 (0.5)  3.2 (0.6) 
Ever had CDR over 25% (pct) 10.7 (0.8)  12.0 (1.1)  7.4 (0.7) 
Cost of attendance components (9-month 
basis, 2014$)        
  Tuition and fees 10,655  (292)  13,398 (262)  3,894 (75) 
    Declined from previous year 
(pct) 13.4 (2.0)  16.8 (2.7)  5.1 (0.6) 
  Room/board (living w/o family) 8,129  (125)  8,249 (171)  7,836 (79) 
    Declined from previous year 
(pct) 11.5 (1.0)  11.7 (1.4)  11.0 (0.9) 
  Other expenses (living w/o family) 4,244  (97)  4,405 (130)  3,845 (52) 
    Declined from previous year 
(pct) 19.6 (2.0)  21.3 (2.7)  15.3 (1.1) 
  Other expenses (living w/ family) 3,995  (96)  4,079 (129)  3,789 (52) 
    Declined from previous year 
(pct) 21.2 (2.0)  22.7 (2.7)  17.4 (1.2) 
Student debt, 2014-15 (2014 $)         
  Graduates 13,476 (583)  14,640 (714)  10,080 (143) 
  Dropouts 5,741 (174)  5,915 (227)  5,259 (58) 
Number of unique OPEIDs 3,177   1,923   1,214 
Number of unique UnitIDs 4,377   3,127   1,250 
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SOURCES: Federal Student Aid/College Scorecard (cohort default rates and student debt), Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (all others). 
NOTES:         
(1) Colleges reporting COA components for the length of their largest program were scaled to a 9-
month basis to compare to colleges reporting for a traditional academic year. 
(2) Declines from the previous year are measured in 
nominal dollars.      
(3) Standard errors are clustered at the OPEID level to reflect how some OPEIDs include multiple 
UnitIDs. 
 
The average default rate in the cohort of students entering repayment in Fiscal Year 2011 was 13.0%, with 
for-profit colleges (12.7%) and public colleges (13.7%) having broadly similar CDRs. Just 3.8% of for-profit 
colleges and 3.2% of public colleges had default rates over the sanctionable level of 25% that year, while 
12.0% of for-profit colleges and 7.4% of public colleges were over 25% at least once during the panel. This 
highlights that only a subset of colleges nationwide are likely affected by the threat of facing federal 
sanctions for high default rates. 
 
Although tuition and fees were more than three times higher at for-profit colleges than public colleges 
($13,398 vs. $3,894), the other cost of attendance components were broadly similar across the two types of 
colleges in the sample. Room and board allowances were $8,129 for nine months at the average college, 
while the miscellaneous expense category for students living away from their families was $4,244 compared 
to $3,995 for students living with their families. Between 12% and 21% of colleges reduced their living 
allowances in nominal dollars between the 2012-13 and 2013-14 academic years, with slightly higher rates of 
decreases among for-profit colleges compared to public colleges. Finally, student debt burdens among those 
who left college in the 2014-15 academic year were $13,476 for graduates who borrowed and $5,741 for 
dropouts who borrowed; students who borrowed at for-profit colleges had more student debt than students 




I used panel regression discontinuity techniques (e.g., Lee & Lemieux, 2010) to test for whether for-profit 
and community colleges with two-year CDRs just above the 25% cutoff for facing federal sanctions reduced 
cost of attendance components in the year following the release of default rate data for the most recent 
cohort compared to for-profit and community colleges just below the cutoff. Regression discontinuity 
techniques compare otherwise similar colleges that fell on either side of a threshold (here, the 25% CDR 
cutoff), while panel regressions are used to look at multiple years of data.  
 
Colleges received the draft cohort default rate between February and April of the year following the end 
of the two-year repayment period that was used during the period of this study. As this is before most 
colleges would set tuition for the following academic year, I assumed that colleges facing the potential of 
either heightened oversight or the loss of federal financial aid may start reacting quickly to their draft default 
rate. However, I allowed for the possibility of delayed responses by also examining the following two 
academic years. 
 
The key threat to the validity of this regression discontinuity approach occurs if colleges are able to 
manipulate their CDR to fall just below the 25.0% threshold for receiving possible sanctions (e.g., McCrary, 
2008). Because colleges get a copy of their draft cohort default rate and then have the potential to challenge 
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any potential inaccuracies before the final default rate is released to the public the following fall, it is 
possible that colleges that were just over the 25% threshold to face sanctions under the draft default rates 
were able to successfully lower their default rates to below 25% after appealing to the Department of 
Education. There is no published evidence that colleges systemically were able to lower their default rates 
during the length of the panel, as the first large-scale change to draft default rates before their release to the 
public did not occur until 2014—after the move to three-year CDRs as the official accountability metric and 
after the period of analysis in this paper (Field, 2014). 
 
I then graphically explored whether colleges appeared to be able to manipulate their default rates to be 
just under the 25% threshold, with Figure 1a showing the broader distribution of CDRs and Figure 1b 
zoomed in around the 25% threshold. These histograms show a jump in the number of observations at a 
default rate of exactly 25.0%, which results in a college receiving sanctions. There were 164 observations 
with a default rate between 24.0% and 24.9%, 90 with a default rate of exactly 25.0%, and 89 with a default 
rate between 25.1% and 25.9%. Put differently, there are more observations at or just above the 25% cutoff 
to receive sanctions (179) than just below it (164)—suggesting that colleges are unable to effectively 


















0 10 20 30 40 50
2-year cohort default rate
Figure 1a: Density of cohort default rates
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Note: The red line in both Figures 1a and 1b represents the 25% CDR threshold. 
 
My analytic strategy consisted of panel regressions with the key independent variable being whether a 
college was over the 25% CDR threshold for potentially facing federal sanctions. There were two main sets 
of outcomes: the inflation-adjusted cost of attendance components and student debt amounts as well as a 
binary indicator for whether a college reduced its cost of attendance components in nominal dollars. I ran 
separate models allowing one-year, two-year, and three-year lags between when default rates were released 
and when prices were measured (with debt burdens receiving an additional one-year lag). My models also 
included institutional-level and year-level fixed effects as well as a set of third-order polynomials between 
the default rate and the 25% threshold for sanctions (following Darolia (2013)). Finally, standard errors were 
clustered at the Federal Student Aid OPEID level instead of the IPEDS UnitID level to reflect how default 
rates are reported to the federal government. This primarily affected the large for-profit college chains in my 
sample. 
 
The primary models (with a one-year lag) were run separately for for-profit and public colleges to see 
whether their reactions to potentially facing sanctions differed from each other. Because for-profit colleges 
do not have the typical shared governance structure of nonprofit colleges (both public and private) that 
results in greater deliberation in the decision-making process, for-profits might be expected to respond 
quicker to any external pressures to cut costs (e.g., Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012). However, this might not 
be true if changes in COA components can be approved in an expedited process at nonprofit colleges. 
 
As an additional test for whether regression discontinuity models are appropriate, I tested for whether 
there was a discontinuity at the 25% default rate threshold using outcome measures from one year following 
the cohort of students entering repayment. For example, I used 2011-12 cost of attendance components for 
students who entered repayment in FY 2010, as draft default rates would not have been released to colleges 
until early 2012 and released to the public in late 2012. The results (Table 3) showed no statistically 
significant differences at p<.05, suggesting that colleges are generally not manipulating living expenses prior 
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Figure 1b: Density of CDRs near 25% cutoff for sanctions
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Table 3: Tests for continuity of pre-treatment outcome metrics.     
Test: Coefficient on 25% CDR indicator        
Measure (from the year before default 
rates were released) 
All colleges   For-profit colleges   Public colleges 
Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE) 
Cost of attendance components (ln)        
Tuition and fees -0.037 (0.023)  -0.035 (0.031)  -0.045 (0.032) 
Room and board (w/o family) -0.001 (0.040)  0.004 (0.060)  -0.051 (0.046) 
Other expenses (w/o family) 0.037 (0.062)  0.107 (0.083)  -0.113 (0.087) 
Other expenses (w/family) 0.091 (0.090)  0.181 (0.112)  -0.089 (0.069) 
Annual drop in components (pct)        
Tuition and fees 2.8 (5.1)  -1.2 (6.3)  15.4 (9.8) 
Room and board (w/o family) 4.6 (5.5)  7.1 (7.3)  0.1 (8.0) 
Other expenses (w/o family) 12.2* (7.0)  14.0 (9.6)  7.9 (8.8) 
Other expenses (w/family) -8.9 (17.6)  -12.1 (23.2)  -1.1 (8.7) 
Student debt levels (ln)         
Graduates -0.022 (0.034)  0.002 (0.043)  -0.006 (0.059) 
Dropouts 0.039 (0.033)  0.056 (0.048)  -0.038 (0.052) 
Max number of observations 33,391   21,486   11,905 
Max unique OPEIDs 2,735  1,717  1,019 
Max unique UnitIDs 4,121   3,042   1,080 
SOURCES: Federal Student Aid and College Scorecard (default rates and debt burdens), IPEDS (all others). 
NOTES: 
(1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. 
(2) For example, the cohort of students entering repayment in FY 2011 was matched with 2012-13 tuition and fees. The 
default rate data window closed in 2012 and draft default rates were released to colleges in spring 2013, making this a 
pre-treatment observation. 
(3) Regression models also control for first, second, and third-order polynomials of the distance from the 25% default 
rate threshold and interactions between the distance and a 25% CDR indicator variable as well as including year and 
institutional fixed effects. 
(4) Standard errors are clustered at the OPEID level to reflect how some colleges with different UnitIDs share the same 
OPEID (and the same default rate). 
(5) The levels of COA components and student debt levels are adjusted for inflation using the CPI, while the indicator 
for a drop between two years is in nominal dollars to reflect the explicit decision to lower allowances. 
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Limitations 
 
The cohort default rate measure has been broadly criticized for its limitations, such as the ability of colleges 
to manipulate default rates by pushing students into deferment or forbearance statuses that result in rising 
balances but fewer defaults within the loan window (Miller, 2015) and the modest correlation between 
reported cohort default rates and the percentage of students repaying at least some principal (Kelchen & Li, 
2017). Although these limitations may disproportionately affect colleges close to the 25% default rate 
threshold, they may affect colleges with lower default rates as colleges face incentives from their 
constituents and the federal government to keep default rates as low as possible. For example, colleges that 
have default rates less than 15% in each of the three most recent cohorts can disburse loan dollars to 
students in one payment at the beginning of the semester instead of having to wait to disburse half of the 
funds until the middle of the academic term (Federal Student Aid, 2018a). Although I did not analyze how 
colleges responded to the 15% default rate threshold in this paper, it deserves future study.  
 
One key limitation of my dataset is that colleges with default rates at or near the threshold for facing 
sanctions may choose to exit the federal student loan program in order to preserve access to Pell Grant 
funds. Colleges that decided to drop out of federal student loan programs as a result of a high CDR prior to 
2000 are not in the dataset, and colleges that dropped out during the length of my panel are only observed 
for a portion of the period. As most of the colleges that opt out of offering loans are community colleges 
and small for-profit colleges with low borrowing rates (Hillman & Jaquette, 2014), this is particularly salient 
in my analysis. It appears that approximately five colleges leave the federal student loan program each year 
while still awarding Pell Grants, although some eventually rejoin the program in later years. Future research 
should examine whether there is a relationship between leaving the federal student loan program and living 
allowances.  
 
I am also unable to observe colleges’ draft cohort default rates, which are what institutions likely use to 
set tuition prices and living allowances for the following year. However, as I detailed earlier, it does not 
appear that colleges were generally able to get their default rates revised to fall below the 25% threshold for 
facing sanctions. Finally, some colleges in the dataset with high default rates may have been able to avoid 
sanctions due to having a small number of borrowers, although this information is never publicized by the 
Department of Education. Because averages across multiple cohorts are used in this situation, the exact 
number of borrowers needed to fall under this threshold may not be known until student borrowing 




I first examined whether colleges appeared to respond to receiving a CDR above 25% for their most recent 
cohort of students by changing their living allowances in a different way than colleges that had CDRs below 
this threshold for potential sanctions. As shown in the left set of columns in Table 4, there is no evidence 
that colleges with sanctionable default rates reduced their rate of change in living allowances compared to 
other colleges; moreover, they were also no more likely to cut their living allowances relative to other 
colleges. Student debt burdens were also not significantly affected, suggesting that colleges did not (or were 
not) able to respond by reducing student borrowing.
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Table 4 
 
Regression discontinuity estimates of all colleges' responses to sanctionable default rate (at least 25% in the given year).  
Outcome measure (1-year lag) 
All colleges   
For-profit 
colleges   Public colleges 
Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE) 
Cost of attendance components (ln)        
Tuition and fees -0.020 (0.021)  -0.024 (0.024)  -0.026 (0.036) 
Room and board (w/o family) 0.025 (0.041)  0.012 (0.054)  0.079 (0.069) 
Other expenses (w/o family) 0.058 (0.056)  0.063 (0.070)  0.123** (0.061) 
Other expenses (w/family) 0.097 (0.068)  0.103 (0.079)  0.171** (0.069) 
Annual drop in components (pct)        
Tuition and fees 0.1 (4.5)  0.9 (5.6)  2.3 (6.3) 
Room and board (w/o family) 3.2 (7.0)  8.2 (8.8)  -10.6 (8.1) 
Other expenses (w/o family) 5.2 (7.3)  10.5 (9.4)  -6.2 (7.6) 
Other expenses (w/family) 6.9 (8.9)  11.7 (11.4)  -2.3 (8.2) 
Student debt levels (ln)         
Graduates 0.022 (0.038)  0.007 (0.044)  -0.008 (0.054) 
Dropouts 0.020 (0.026)  0.030 (0.034)  0.045 (0.040) 
Max number of observations 35.391   21,486   11,905 
Max unique OPEIDs 2,736  1,717  1,019 
Max unique UnitIDs 4,122   3,042   1,080 
SOURCES: Federal Student Aid and College Scorecard (default rates and debt burdens), IPEDS (all 
others). 
NOTES:         
(1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. 
(2) Regression models also control for first, second, and third-order polynomials of the distance from the 
25% default rate threshold and interactions between the distance and a 25% CDR indicator variable as 
well as including year and institutional fixed effects. 
(3) Standard errors are clustered at the OPEID level to reflect how some colleges with different UnitIDs 
share the same OPEIDs (and the same default rate). 
(4) The levels of COA components and student debt levels are adjusted for inflation using the CPI, while 
the indicator for a drop between two years is in nominal dollars to reflect the explicit decision to lower 
allowances. 
  
The rest of Table 4 examines these patterns separately for for-profit (center) and public two-year or 
certificate-granting (right) colleges. Again, there is little evidence that colleges are strategically responding to 
high default rates by trying to change student borrowing. There are no statistically significant findings 
among for-profit colleges, while the only significant results among public colleges are that receiving a high 
CDR may be associated with larger living allowances in the miscellaneous expense categories for off-campus 
students (p<.05). Again, there were no differences in debt burdens of graduates or dropouts based on 
whether their college crossed the 25% CDR threshold. 
 
Finally, I explored the possibility that colleges may take more time than one year to react and change 
their living allowances. Table 5 repeats the overall results when using a one-year lag and also includes results 
under two-year and three-year lags. In general, the results are again statistically insignificant, although there 
are a few components using a two-year lag that are marginally significant at p<.10 in both positive and 
negative directions. There are few clear trends between the one-year and three-year lags, although more 
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coefficients change from positive and insignificant to negative and insignificant when a three-year lag is 
used. Altogether, this suggests little evidence that colleges are manipulating their living allowances in an 
effort to limit student borrowing (and future defaults); these null findings also hold across a range of 




Sensitivity checks of all colleges' responses to sanctionable default rates (at least 25% in the given year) using different lag 
periods. 
  
Outcome measure  
1-year lag   2-year lag   3-year lag 
Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE)   Coeff. (SE) 
Cost of attendance components (ln)        
Tuition and fees -0.020 (0.021)  0.009 (0.019)  0.027 (0.022) 
Room and board (w/o family) 0.025 (0.041)  -0.016 (0.036)  -0.011 (0.035) 
Other expenses (w/o family) 0.058 (0.056)  -0.053 (0.052)  -0.030 (0.054) 
Other expenses (w/family) 0.097 (0.068)  -0.022 (0.060)  0.020 (0.064) 
Annual drop in components (pct)        
Tuition and fees 0.1 (4.5)  -6.7* (3.8)  6.9 (5.1) 
Room and board (w/o family) 3.2 (7.0)  7.9 (5.7)  -1.1 (5.1) 
Other expenses (w/o family) 5.2 (7.3)  11.1* (5.8)  4.4 (5.2) 
Other expenses (w/family) 6.9 (8.9)  11.5* (6.4)  6.4 (5.3) 
Student debt levels (ln)         
Graduates 0.022 (0.038)  -0.015 (0.032)  -0.018 (0.032) 
Dropouts 0.020 (0.026)  -0.019 (0.026)  -0.043 (0.059) 
Max number of observations 35.391   35,366   32,601 
Max unique OPEIDs 2,736  2,853  2,655 
Max unique UnitIDs 4,122   4,153   3,888 
SOURCES: Federal Student Aid and College Scorecard (default rates and debt burdens), IPEDS (all others). 
NOTES:         
(1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. 
(2) Regression models also control for first, second, and third-order polynomials of the distance from the 
25% default rate threshold and interactions between the distance and a 25% CDR indicator variable as well 
as including year and institutional fixed effects. 
(3) Standard errors are clustered at the OPEID level to reflect how some colleges with different UnitIDs 
share the same OPEIDs (and the same default rate). 
(4) The levels of COA components and student debt levels are adjusted for inflation using the CPI, while 
the indicator for a drop between two years is in nominal dollars to reflect the explicit decision to lower 
allowances. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
As the potential loss of federal financial aid dollars due to high cohort default rates has the potential to 
jeopardize the existence of many colleges, institutions have an incentive to take steps to reduce CDRs. In 
this paper, I explored one potential way that colleges could potentially reduce student borrowing (and thus 
future default rates)—by reducing non-tuition portions of the cost of attendance that students can use to 
help pay for living expenses. I find no evidence that either public or for-profit colleges strategically reduced 
their living allowances after receiving a high default rate and that student debt burdens were unaffected. 
 




Journal of Student Financial Aid  Center for Economic Education at the University of Louisville  Vol. 49, N1, 2019                15 
This null finding could be explained by a combination of factors. The first is that colleges carefully set 
living allowances to meet the needs of their students instead of the institution as a whole. This is plausible, 
although the wide variation in living allowances within the same geographic area (Kelchen et al., 2017) 
suggests that colleges may not feel it is appropriate to cut living allowances following a high default rate 
rather than because their allowances are perfectly aligned with student needs. 
 
Colleges (particularly public institutions) may not feel like the U.S. Department of Education will follow 
through and end their access to Title IV financial aid funds after three years of high default rates. The 
Congressional Research Service reported in 2015 that only 11 colleges had lost full Title IV access due to 
high default rates (United States Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, 2015), although 
this small number is partially due to colleges opting out of the federal student loan program to protect Pell 
Grant access. Colleges may also be able to avoid sanctions through default management practices (e.g., 
Blumenstyk, 2010), while community colleges can sometimes be exempted on account of the small 
percentage of students at their institutions that borrow (Federal Student Aid, 2018a). Finally, the 
Department of Education has previously changed default rate calculations just before releasing the data to 
the public in a way that allowed some colleges to avoid facing sanctions (Stratford, 2014); colleges may 
expect this to happen again if they face the loss of aid. 
 
Due to the growth of income-driven student loan repayment programs, colleges are facing a decreasing 
risk of federal sanctions due to high cohort default rates. With the introduction of the student loan 
repayment metric in the College Scorecard, policymakers have a new metric that they can potentially use to 
examine whether a college’s former students are able to handle their loan burdens. Loan repayment rates 
tend to be lower for community colleges and for-profit colleges than other sectors of higher education due 
to student characteristics and the generally lower returns to these credentials (Kelchen & Li, 2017), so 
colleges in these two sectors need to be acutely aware of any legislation (such as risk sharing proposals that 
require colleges to repay a portion of loans that their former students do not repay) that may hold colleges 
accountable for loan repayment rates in addition to or instead of default rates. 
 
Colleges often raise concerns about being held accountable for students borrowing for the non-tuition 
portions of the cost of attendance. Although colleges do not appear to be manipulating the components in 
an effort to reduce their default rates, institutions do face incentives to limit the rate of increase in these 
measures for other reasons. For example, as the net price of attendance becomes an increasingly visible data 
element that is used in certain accountability systems, college administrators (who are influential in setting 
tuition prices) may pressure financial aid officers to reconsider increases in living allowances due to the 
implications on net price.  
 
In order for colleges to be on a more similar footing with respect to living allowances, the federal 
government should consider adjusting for local living costs and economic conditions when holding colleges 
accountable for student charges, debt burdens, and repayment rates. For example, colleges that are in high 
cost of living areas with struggling local economies could have lower repayment rate expectations from the 
federal government than institutions that are in less-expensive, thriving areas. This would place more of a 
focus on tuition expenses or other types of revenue that colleges directly receive instead of judging colleges 
on the amount of loan dollars that pass through to students. This is especially important given the share of 
students who struggle with basic needs security in college above and beyond paying for tuition (Goldrick-
Rab, Baker-Smith, Coca, Looker, & Williams, 2019). 
 
Finally, colleges that are concerned about high cohort default rates would be wise to focus on student 
success initiatives that are designed to increase the likelihood of completion. Students who do not complete 
college are far more likely to default on their loans than students who graduate (Gross et al., 2009; Kelchen 
& Li, 2017), and research suggests that additional spending on improving institutional capacity is more 
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effective in increasing completion rates than trying to reduce the overall price tag (Deming & Walters, 2017). 
Colleges may wish to guard against reducing educational expenditures because many students are likely 
better off taking on more debt to complete a high-quality education than to borrow less and risk dropping 
out. 
 
Nexus: Implications for Practice 
• Colleges face pressure to reduce their cohort default rates, but their options to limit 
student borrowing are currently limited as colleges generally cannot stop students from 
borrowing up to the federal loan limits. 
• One potential way colleges could try to reduce borrowing is to reduce the allowance for 
non-tuition expenses in the total cost of attendance. Yet I find that colleges with high 
default rates do not engage in this type of strategic behavior, nor do they see lower 
student debt burdens among borrowers in subsequent years than colleges with slightly 
lower default rates. 
• Financial aid professionals should be aware of pressures from the federal government, 
their accrediting agency, and institutional leaders to reduce cohort default rates and 
increase student loan repayment rates in the future. Focusing on college completion 
efforts may be the most effective method to improve student outcomes. 
• Financial aid professionals should consider pushing for future accountability metrics to 
take non-tuition living expenses into account, particularly regarding variations in living 
costs in different parts of the country. 
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